The Cheng Kejie case involved the largest bribery amount among senior leading officials since the founding of New China, and it remains the highest-ranking leading official ever subjected to capital punishment for the crime of accepting bribes. Unlike the Hu Changqing case, which was exposed by a “disappearance,” the clue in the Cheng Kejie case came from a single disclosure made during the review of a person involved in another case—two orders to sell white sugar at depressed prices led to a shocking case involving more than 40 million yuan in bribes.
I. The Sugar Incident: A Clue from a Single Disclosure
In January 1999, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was handling other cases in Guangxi. While reviewing a person involved in a case, this individual, hoping to earn merit, voluntarily disclosed a piece of information: during his tenure as Chairman of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Cheng Kejie had twice instructed him to demand 7,000 tons of sugar from the Guigang Sugar Factory at a depressed price for a Hong Kong businessman named Li Ping to resell, so as to earn a high price differential.
The content of this disclosure was not complicated, and the amount involved was negligible compared with the total bribery amount later verified. But the investigators captured a key signal from it: why would a chairman of an autonomous region personally concern himself with the price differential on several thousand tons of white sugar? Who was Li Ping? What was the relationship between Cheng Kejie and Li Ping? If it were merely normal commercial dealings, there would have been no need for the chairman to twice “instruct” a price reduction. The investigators judged that behind these two sugar-reselling incidents there might be a much larger problem.
Under the explicit instructions of CCDI leaders, the investigation quietly unfolded. The preliminary investigation confirmed the investigators’ judgment: Li Ping’s reselling of white sugar at depressed prices through Cheng Kejie’s instructions was only the tip of the iceberg. The preliminary investigation revealed that over several years, Cheng Kejie and Li Ping had obtained large sums of money by helping others secure projects and approve loans. Their main accomplice in amassing wealth was Zhou Kun, general manager of Guangxi Yinxing Company.
II. Preliminary Investigation and Arrest: A Race Against Time
In July 1999, the main leaders of the CCDI listened to a report on the preliminary investigation of the Cheng Kejie case and explicitly instructed that all of Cheng Kejie’s problems be investigated one by one. But the investigation did not proceed without obstacles—Cheng Kejie himself had already become aware of something.
According to later reports, Cheng Kejie felt guilty and repeatedly asked Li Ping to leave Guangxi and hide elsewhere; while attending a meeting in Beijing, he even called Li Ping and urged her to “run away as fast as you can, the farther the better.” This meant that if action were not taken soon, key persons involved might flee abroad and evidence might be destroyed.
After careful deployment, the investigators acted decisively. The first step was to quickly bring Li Ping to justice. The second step was to control Zhou Kun, general manager of Yinxing Company, who was waiting for an opportunity to flee, in Nanning. Two key figures were apprehended at the same time, and the first battle was won. With the confessions of Li Ping and Zhou Kun, Cheng Kejie’s corrupt features began to be fully exposed.
After painstaking efforts, the investigators ultimately obtained all the evidence of Cheng Kejie’s violations of discipline and law spanning nearly ten years and involving more than a hundred people, forming an interlocking and mutually corroborating chain of evidence. In August 1999, the CPC Central Committee formally decided that the CCDI would review Cheng Kejie’s suspected bribery and other problems. Confronted with ironclad facts, Cheng Kejie confessed to the serious problem of accepting bribes amounting to tens of millions of yuan together with Li Ping.
III. The Starting Point of the “Duet”: From Mistress to Accomplice
To understand how the more than 40 million yuan in bribes accumulated, one must return to the starting point of the relationship between Cheng Kejie and Li Ping.
Li Ping was born in January 1954, settled in Hong Kong at the end of 1981, became a permanent resident of Hong Kong in 1988, and registered a company in Hong Kong. In August 1992, Cheng Kejie and Li Ping had a sexual relationship. At the end of 1993, the two prepared to divorce their respective spouses and marry each other, and discussed a plan that seemed “only natural” at the time: while Cheng Kejie was still in office, use his authority to jointly prepare money for their married life.
The content of this discussion was later recognized in court as direct evidence of the intent to jointly accept bribes. The division of labor they agreed upon was: Li Ping would contact clients and collect bribes, Cheng Kejie would use his position to seek benefits for the clients, and the money and property received would be kept overseas for use after marriage. In the years that followed, the two performed scene after scene of power-for-money “duets” in this manner.
IV. The First Big Deal: The Xiyuan Plot and Yinxing Company
The core target of Cheng Kejie and Li Ping’s wealth accumulation was Guangxi Yinxing Industrial Development Company (formerly Guangxi Yinxing Housing Development Company) and its general manager Zhou Kun. The first “cooperation” between the two sides centered on a plot of land at the entrance to the Xiyuan Hotel in Nanning.
In early 1994, while chatting with Zhou Kun, Li Ping mentioned that there was a plot of land at the entrance to the Xiyuan Hotel; whoever could get it would make a fortune, but “no one but Cheng Kejie can get it.” Li Ping relayed this to Cheng Kejie, who said there was “absolutely no problem” in getting the land. Li Ping then negotiated terms with Zhou Kun, who promised that if he got the land, he could give 8 to 10 million yuan in kickbacks.
To make the operation “legitimate,” on March 10, 1994, Cheng Kejie used his authority to change Guangxi Yinxing Housing Development Company from being affiliated with Guangxi International Economic and Technical Cooperation Company to being directly under the leadership and management of the Autonomous Region Government General Office. Subsequently, Zhou Kun proposed: the land price was too high, and if it could be reduced to below 700,000 yuan per mu, the kickback could be increased. Cheng Kejie agreed without hesitation and instructed the Nanning Municipal Government to reduce the transfer price of the 85 mu of land for the project from an appraised price of more than 960,000 yuan per mu to 550,000 yuan.
After the land price was reduced, Zhou Kun raised new conditions: funds were tight and he could not pay the kickback for the time being; if Cheng Kejie could help secure a loan, not only could the kickback be paid, but it could be increased according to the loan amount. Cheng Kejie then called the president of the Guangxi Branch of China Construction Bank multiple times, demanding loans for Yinxing Company. Under pressure, the Guangxi Branch of China Construction Bank issued a loan of 70 million yuan to Yinxing Company.
Through the three links of approving the project, reducing the land price, and securing loans, the “kickback” for Cheng Kejie and Li Ping rose from the initial 8 to 10 million yuan to 16 million yuan, and finally settled at 20 million yuan. This huge sum thus fell into their pockets under the name of a “kickback.” As for how much land transfer revenue the state lost and who bore the loan risk, that was not within Cheng Kejie’s consideration.
V. The Second Big Deal: The Ethnic Palace Project
After the Xiyuan Parking City (Jiangnan Parking and Shopping City) transaction was completed, the “cooperation” between Cheng Kejie and Zhou Kun moved to a second project: the Guangxi Ethnic Palace project.
From the first half of 1996 to the end of 1997, Cheng Kejie learned from Li Ping that helping Yinxing Company undertake the Ethnic Palace project and solve construction funding could likewise bring huge kickbacks. He used his authority to carry out a series of operations: assigning the project to be jointly developed and constructed by Yinxing Company and the Autonomous Region Ethnic Affairs Commission, and changing the project legal person from the originally designated Autonomous Region Ethnic Affairs Commission to Yinxing Company; requiring the Guangxi Branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to issue a loan of 30 million yuan to Yinxing Company; in violation of state regulations, instructing the Autonomous Region Housing Reform Office to lend 25 million yuan from the housing reform fund to Yinxing Company; instructing the Autonomous Region Finance Department to lend 50 million yuan of fiscal revolving funds to Yinxing Company; and also applying to the State Development Planning Commission for 13 million yuan in project subsidy funds for Yinxing Company.
These operations involved multiple departments and multiple funding channels, from bank loans to housing reform funds to fiscal revolving funds, and almost every one bore the mark of “violation.” But as chairman of the autonomous region, Cheng Kejie’s instructions encountered almost no open resistance within Guangxi. After the matter was accomplished, Yinxing Company paid Cheng Kejie and Li Ping bribes of 9 million yuan in Renminbi and 8.04 million Hong Kong dollars as agreed.
In the course of advancing these two major projects, Cheng Kejie and Li Ping also accepted personal gifts from Zhou Kun, including Renminbi, Hong Kong dollars, US dollars, and valuables such as gold diamond rings, gold bricks, gold handicrafts, and watches, totaling more than 550,000 yuan.
VI. Other Bribery Facts: Loans, Projects, and Selling Official Posts
Yinxing Company was not the only bribe-giver. The bribery facts established by the court also involved multiple fields.
In the field of loans, from July to October 1994, Cheng Kejie helped Guangxi Trust and Investment Corporation and its subordinate Guangxi Guixin Industrial Development Company secure loans totaling 16 million yuan, from which he accepted bribes of 600,000 yuan. In the field of projects, in July 1997, Cheng Kejie accepted a request and used his authority to instruct relevant departments to directly intervene in the bidding for the drainage and leveling tunnel project in the reservoir area of the Yantan Hydropower Station, illegally changing the winning bid result so that the Tunnel Engineering Bureau of the Ministry of Railways undertook the project, from which he accepted bribes of 1.8 million yuan.
In addition, Cheng Kejie also used his authority to seek benefits for others in terms of official promotion. Gan Weiren, former deputy county head of Hepu County; Zhou Yisheng, former director of the Haicheng Branch of the Beihai Public Security Bureau; and Li Yihong, former director of the Service Center of the Autonomous Region Planning Commission, obtained promotion or transfer through Cheng Kejie’s recommendation or approval, and Cheng Kejie, alone or together with Li Ping, accepted bribes totaling 288,000 yuan and 3,000 US dollars.
Summarizing these facts, the court ultimately determined that Cheng Kejie, alone or together with Li Ping, accepted bribes in cash and goods totaling more than 41.09 million yuan. Of this, Li Ping paid 11.5 million yuan to Hong Kong businessman Zhang Jinghai, who helped transfer and withdraw the money, and Cheng Kejie and Li Ping actually obtained more than 29.59 million yuan in bribes. Most of the illicit money and goods were transferred by Li Ping to Hong Kong for safekeeping and were all recovered after the case was exposed.
VII. Review, Prosecution, and Trial
After the formal CCDI review in August 1999, Cheng Kejie confessed to his problems. In view of the particularly serious circumstances of his violations of discipline and law and the extremely bad political impact, on January 11, 2000, the CCDI recommended to the Central Committee that Cheng Kejie be expelled from the Party, that he be removed in accordance with law from his posts as Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and deputy to the National People’s Congress, and that the case be transferred to the judicial authorities.
On April 20, 2000, the CCDI held a press conference to announce the investigation and handling. On April 21, the Standing Committee of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region People’s Congress removed Cheng Kejie from his post as a deputy to the Ninth National People’s Congress. On April 25, the 15th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress voted to remove Cheng Kejie from his post as Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. On the same day, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate filed and investigated the Cheng Kejie case in accordance with law and decided to arrest him.
On June 26, the First Branch of the Beijing Municipal People’s Procuratorate filed a public prosecution for the crime of accepting bribes with the First Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing. On July 13 and 14, the First Intermediate Court of Beijing held a public hearing of the case in accordance with law. The trial lasted two days, and the court investigated and cross-examined the facts that Cheng Kejie, using his authority, together with Li Ping or alone, sought benefits for others and accepted huge bribes. Cheng Kejie denied some of the charges, but after reviewing all the evidence, the court responded to the defendant’s arguments and defense opinions one by one. It is worth noting that advanced multimedia equipment of the time was installed for the trial of this case, marking the beginning of multimedia construction in courtrooms across the country, and many news media reported the entire trial.
VIII. The Judgment
On July 31, 2000, the First Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing issued its first-instance judgment: Cheng Kejie was guilty of the crime of accepting bribes, sentenced to death, deprived of political rights for life, and subject to confiscation of all personal property. Cheng Kejie was dissatisfied and filed an appeal. On August 22, the Higher People’s Court of Beijing ruled to reject the appeal, uphold the original judgment, and submit it to the Supreme People’s Court for approval in accordance with law. On September 7, the Supreme People’s Court ruled to approve Cheng Kejie’s death sentence. On September 14, Cheng Kejie was executed.
In its review, the Supreme People’s Court pointed out that Cheng Kejie and Li Ping conspired to amass money for marriage after their respective divorces; Li Ping contacted clients and collected bribes, and Cheng Kejie used his position to seek benefits for the clients—the two had constituted joint bribery. The money and property from the joint bribery were kept by Li Ping, and most were received through Li Ping’s hands; this was the division of labor in their joint crime, and the fact that the property did not pass through Cheng Kejie’s own hands does not affect the determination of his crime of accepting bribes. Although Cheng Kejie once expressed willingness to return the illicit money, the illicit money in this case was recovered with Li Ping’s cooperation, and his expression of willingness to return it did not play a substantive role and did not constitute a statutory circumstance for lighter or mitigated punishment.